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1An Overview of Physical Layer Security with Finite-Alphabet
Signaling
Sina Rezaei Aghdam, Member, IEEE, Alireza Nooraiepour, Student Member, IEEE, and
Tolga M. Duman, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Providing secure communications over the physical
layer with the objective of achieving secrecy without requiring
a secret key has been receiving growing attention within the
past decade. The vast majority of the existing studies in the
area of physical layer security focus exclusively on the scenarios
where the channel inputs are Gaussian distributed. However,
in practice, the signals employed for transmission are drawn
from discrete signal constellations such as phase shift keying and
quadrature amplitude modulation. Hence, understanding the im-
pact of the finite-alphabet input constraints and designing secure
transmission schemes under this assumption is a mandatory step
towards a practical implementation of physical layer security.
With this motivation, this article reviews recent developments on
physical layer security with finite-alphabet inputs. We explore
transmit signal design algorithms for single-antenna as well as
multi-antenna wiretap channels under different assumptions on
the channel state information at the transmitter. Moreover, we
present a review of the recent results on secure transmission with
discrete signaling for various scenarios including multi-carrier
transmission systems, broadcast channels with confidential mes-
sages, cognitive multiple access and relay networks. Throughout
the article, we stress the important behavioral differences of
discrete versus Gaussian inputs in the context of the physical
layer security. We also present an overview of practical code
construction over Gaussian and fading wiretap channels, and
discuss some open problems and directions for future research.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication technologies have become an in-
dispensable part of our everyday lives. As more and more
data is being transmitted over wireless links, along with the
reliability of the transmission, ensuring security of informa-
tion transfer has become a challenging issue. Maintaining
confidentiality of the transmitted data, preventing corruption
of the transmitted information and verifying authenticity of
communication are the most important security requirements
in a wireless network. Traditionally, protecting confidentiality
of data transmission is addressed via computation-based mech-
anisms such as encryption. On the other hand, the security
provided by these methods mainly relies on the conjecture
that the encryption function is difficult to invert, which is not
provable from a mathematical point of view. With the ever-
increasing computing power, encryption may no longer prevent
information leakage to sophisticated adversaries. Moreover,
implementation of key-based secure communications requires
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complicated protocols for key distribution and management,
which is highly challenging to implement in the cases of
decentralized wireless networks.
Securing transmission at the physical layer is an alternative
or a complement to the cryptographic solutions. The basic
idea is to exploit the inherent randomness of the channel for
achieving secrecy. Dissimilar to encryption based methods, in
the schemes employing physical layer security, no constraint
is placed on the computational capability of the eavesdropper.
Furthermore, no key distribution/management is required in its
implementation.
During the past decade there has been an extensive growth
of interest in studying the capabilities of physical layer for
securing communication. Several surveys and overview papers
are available describing the state-of-the-art on this topic. For
instance, fundamentals of physical layer security are com-
prehensively explained in [1]-[6]. A review of recent results
ranging from point-to-point communications to multiuser sce-
narios is given in [7]. The authors in [8] present a survey on
physical layer security under channel state information (CSI)
uncertainty at different nodes. A comprehensive overview on
various multiple antenna techniques in physical layer security
is provided in [9]. The potentials of physical layer security for
safeguarding data confidentiality in the fifth generation (5G)
networks is studied in [10] and two updated summaries of the
recent research results on physical layer security techniques
for 5G and next generation wireless networks are given in
[11] and [12].
The existing literature reviews provide a comprehensive
understanding of the fundamentals of physical layer security.
However, less is said about the practical aspects. Adoption
of physical layer security techniques in the next generation
networks requires a number of important practical issues to
be addressed. With this motivation, a high-level overview of
these issues is provided in a recent IEEE Communications
Magazine paper [13]. While [13] provides the big picture, our
objective in this survey is to shed light on two important (and
highly related) practical aspects, namely, secure transmission
with discrete signaling and practical code construction. We
present a detailed review of the related recent results, underline
the important behavioral differences between Gaussian inputs
and discrete signaling, and study the transmit signal design
problem for securing communications in a variety of scenarios.
We also provide a review of recent results on code design for
secrecy, and make connections with the information theoretic
results with finite inputs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we provide a description of the fundamental
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concepts in physical layer security including the wiretap
channel model and different secrecy metrics. In Section III,
we discuss the differences between the secrecy performance
of constellation-constrained and Gaussian inputs over Gaus-
sian wiretap channels. An overview of secure multi-antenna
transmission schemes with finite-alphabet inputs is provided in
Section IV. Sections V, VI and VII discuss the scenarios with
multi-carrier transmission, spread spectrum communications
and multiuser channels, respectively. Section VIII focuses on
applications of physical layer security techniques in the next
generation wireless networks including 5G. An overview of
practical code design approaches for secrecy is presented
in Section IX, followed by concluding remarks and future
research directions in Section X. The organizational structure
of the paper is given in Fig. 1.
Notation: Vectors and matrices are denoted with lower-
case and uppercase bold letters. Non-bold letters are used
to denote scalar values and calligraphic letters denote sets.
The expectation and probability mass (or density) function
of a random variable W is denoted by EW {.} and PW (.),
respectively. Pr(.) is used to denote the probability of an
event. An stands for a sequence of length n, i.e., An ={A(1),A(2), . . . ,A(n)}. The notation CN (m,R) denotes a
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random vector with
mean vector m and covariance matrix R.
II. FUNDAMENTALS
The wiretap channel model, originally introduced by Wyner
in [15], is the most basic scenario in the study of physical
layer security. In this model, while the sender Alice wishes
to transmit a message signal to a legitimate receiver Bob; a
third party, Eve, is present with the capability of eavesdropping
on Alice’s signal. The channel between Alice and Bob, and
the channel between Alice and Eve are referred to as the
main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel, respectively. In
physical layer security, one is interested in transmitting in such
a way to maximize the transmission rate over the main channel
while keeping the eavesdropper ignorant about the message.
This leads to the notion of secrecy capacity, which is defined
as the maximum rate at which the transmitter can use the main
link so as to deliver its message to the legitimate receiver in
a way that the eavesdropper cannot successfully obtain any
information about it. Characterization of the secrecy capacity
is one of the most fundamental problems in the literature of
physical layer security in that it can provide us with vital
implications on how secure transmission techniques can be
designed.
A. Different Notions of Secrecy
Consider a transmitter who wishes to transmit a message M
to a legitimate receiver while trying to keep an eavesdropper
ignorant about it. M is mapped to a codeword Xn using a
stochastic encoder with n denoting the number of channel
uses. Then, Xn is transmitted, and Y n and Zn are received
at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively.
The eavesdropper’s level of uncertainty is quantified using the
equivocation rate given by
Re = 1
n
H(M ∣Zn), (1)
which is nothing but a measure of how unlikely it is for an
eavesdropper to infer source information from its received
signal. According to this definition, large equivocation rates
are equivalent to higher secrecy levels.
There are different metrics for measuring the secrecy guar-
anteed by a specific scheme among which the information-
theoretic ones are recognized as the strongest. Perfect secrecy
is achievable in a system if the message M and its corre-
sponding encoder output Xn are statistically independent [16].
This can be expressed as I(M ;Xn) = 0, which means that
the mutual information between the message and the encoded
signal is exactly zero. This is to say, the eavesdropper is
not capable of recovering the message via observation of the
3encoder output. For this form of secrecy to be guaranteed,
a secret key of the length at least equal to the length of
the message should be used. However, weaker requirements
can be adopted for evaluation of the secrecy in practical
scenarios. One example of such notions is semantic secrecy,
which is achieved if it is guaranteed that Zn does not increase
the probability of guessing an arbitrary function f of M
(with an arbitrary distribution PM ) by more than  > 0 if
Adv(M ;Zn) < , where advantage Adv(M ;Zn) is defined
as the maximum of
∑
zn
PZn(zn) max
fi∈supp(f)Pr(f(M) = fi∣zn)− max
fi∈supp(f)Pr(f(M) = fi), (2)
where supp(.) stands for the support of the function in its
argument, over f and PM .
Assuming a uniform distribution for the message M ,
a system is called to operate with strong secrecy if
limn→∞ I(M ;Zn) = 0, which means that if we consider
codewords of n symbols being transmitted by Alice as Xn,
the information leaked by observation of the received vector
Zn shall go to zero as n goes to infinity. On the other hand,
the condition limn→∞ 1nI(M ;Zn) = 0 is referred to as weak
secrecy. In particular, weak secrecy requires the asymptotic
rate of information leakage to be sublinear in n. Different
notions of secrecy, which are used to measure the secrecy
guaranteed by a specific scheme are summarized in Table I.
TABLE I: Four notions of secrecy.
Notion Requirement
Perfect Secrecy [16] I(M ;Xn) = 0
Semantic Secrecy [14] Adv(M ;Zn) < 
Strong Secrecy [17] limn→∞ I(M ;Zn) = 0
Weak Secrecy [15] limn→∞ 1n I(M ;Zn) = 0
B. Secrecy Capacity of Single-Antenna Wiretap Channels
The notion of secrecy capacity was originally introduced by
Wyner in [15] for degraded wiretap channels. In the scenario
studied in [15], the main channel and the eavesdropper’s
channel are assumed to be discrete memoryless channels
(DMCs) where Eve’s observation of the transmitted signal is a
degraded version of the signal received by Bob. Wyner showed
that the secrecy capacity for this scenario can be expressed as
the difference of the mutual information between Alice’s and
Bob’s signals with that of Alice and Eve, maximized over
all input distributions. An extension of the notion of secrecy
capacity to the case of additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channels is studied in [18]. It is shown that, for the case of
a Gaussian wiretap channel, a nonzero secrecy capacity can
be attained if Bob receives the signal through a less noisy
channel.
While the scenarios considered in [15] and [18] put the
eavesdropper at a disadvantage, Csisza´r and Ko¨rner have
studied the more general problem of secrecy for non-degraded
channels in [19]. In this channel model, referred to as broad-
cast channel with confidential messages, the message trans-
mitted by Alice contains a common message intended to both
Bob and Eve as well as a secret message, which is intended
for Bob only, and is needed to be kept secret from Eve. It is
shown that the secrecy capacity over a discrete memoryless
wiretap channel (DMWC) is given by
Cs = max
PX∣U ,PU I(U ;Y ) − I(U ;Z), (3)
where U is an auxiliary random variable. With a given
PY Z∣X(y, z∣x), the secrecy capacity is achieved by maximiz-
ing the difference of the mutual information terms correspond-
ing to the main and the eavesdropper’s channels over all joint
distributions PUX(u,x) where U satisfies the Markov chain
relationship U →X → Y Z.
In order to study the physical layer security in wireless
communication scenarios, we need to extend the wiretap
channel to a model that takes into account the fading phe-
nomenon. Assuming a narrowband transmission, fading is
modeled as multiplicative gains over the main and eavesdrop-
per’s channels, denoted by HB and HE , respectively. The first
characterization of the role of fading in providing physical
layer security is given in [20] where quasi-static fading chan-
nels are considered towards the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper. It is shown via analyzing the secrecy outage
probability that, in presence of fading, secure transmission is
possible even in the scenarios where the eavesdropper has a
better signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). The authors in [21] obtain
the ergodic secrecy capacity region for the fading broadcast
channel with confidential messages (BCC) by deriving the
boundary achieving optimal power allocation strategies. The
secrecy capacity over block fading channels is derived in
[22] under the assumption that each coherence interval is
long enough to allow for invoking proper random coding
arguments. Given that the transmitter knows either the main
CSI (MCSI) or both the main and the eavesdropper CSI (ECSI)
perfectly, an achievable secrecy rate can be formulated as [22]:
Rs = EHB ,HE{[I(X;Y ∣HB) − I(X;Z ∣HE)]+}, (4)
where [a]+ = max{a,0}. It is shown in [22] that the secrecy
capacity that is achieved under the full CSI assumption serves
as an upper bound on the secrecy capacity when only MCSI
is known at the transmitter. This is due to the fact that
with the knowledge of the instantaneous ECSI, the transmitter
is capable of realizing a more efficient transmission, which
provides additional gains in terms of secrecy rates. For in-
stance, when perfect knowledge of both channels are available,
the transmitter can optimize the transmit power according to
the instantaneous values of the channel gains HB and HE ,
providing a higher secrecy rate with respect to the case where
the optimization of the transmit power is carried out according
to the main channel only.
Under the assumption that the transmitter does not know
the realizations of the channels, and it only has their statistics,
assuming that each receiver knows its own channel, the secrecy
4capacity can be obtained with the aid of the results for the case
of DMWC [19] as
Cs = max
PX∣U ,PU I(U ;Y,HB) − I(U ;Z,HE), (5)
where U satisfies the Markov chain relationship U → X →(Y,HB), (Z,HE). This is obtained by treating HB and
HE as channel outputs at the legitimate receiver and at
the eavesdropper, respectively [23]. Using the chain rule of
mutual information and noting the fact that HB and HE are
independent of X and U , the expression in (5) can be modified
as
Cs = max
PX∣U ,PU EHBI(U ;Y ∣HB) −EHEI(U ;Z ∣HE). (6)
Determining the optimal joint distribution PUX(u,x) and the
resulting exact secrecy capacity is an open problem, however,
by ignoring the channel prefixing, the performance can be
quantified using an achievable ergodic secrecy rate as given
by
Rs = [EHBI(X;Y ∣HB) −EHEI(X;Z ∣HE)]+. (7)
C. Secrecy Capacity of Multi-Antenna Wiretap Channels
Multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel is
an extension of the wiretap channel to a scenario where all
the nodes, namely, Alice, Bob and Eve, are equipped with
multiple antennas. Under the full CSI assumption, secrecy
capacity for this setup is determined independently by Khisti
and Wornell [24], and Oggier and Hassibi [25]. The results in
[19] are employed by Khisti and Wornell so as to develop
a genie-aided upper bound on the secrecy capacity in the
general case of non-degraded MIMO wiretap channels. While
their characterization is through a saddlepoint, Oggier and
Hassibi propose an alternative approach through a single
optimization process. It is shown that the achievable secrecy
rate is maximized when the channel input is Gaussian, and the
secrecy capacity of a MIMO wiretap channel is given by
Cs = max
Kx⪰0,Tr(Kx)=P log det(I +HBKxHHB )− log det(I +HEKxHHE ), (8)
where Kx = E{xxH}, and HB ∈ CNB×Nt and HE ∈ CNE×Nt
are the channel matrices corresponding to the legitimate re-
ceiver and the eavesdropper, respectively.
An alternative characterization of the secrecy capacity of
the MIMO wiretap channel is presented by Liu and Shamai
in [26] where they consider a more general matrix constraint
on the channel input. We highlight that, while [24]–[26] prove
that the optimal input is Gaussian, the optimal input covariance
matrix needs to be determined using numerical optimization
approaches (see, e.g., [27]–[28]). A set of equations describing
the optimal channel input under partial CSI at the transmitter
(CSIT) along with algorithms for obtaining the solution are
given in [29].
D. Other Secrecy Metrics
Secrecy capacity is the most widely used measure for
evaluation of the secrecy performance. However, a complete
characterization of the secrecy capacity region is prohibitive
in some scenarios. In such cases, alternative metrics can be
adopted as surveyed below.
1) Secrecy Outage Probability: Secrecy outage occurs
when the instantaneous secrecy capacity falls below a target
secrecy rate Rs. In delay-critical applications and for scenarios
with quasi-static fading, encoding over multiple channel states
is not possible. In these cases, secure transmission schemes
can be designed such that the probability of occurrence of
an outage event is minimized. Obviously, this serves as a
weaker notion than secrecy capacity. This is due to the fact
that, with this formulation, secrecy is not guaranteed for the
entire transmission duration.
2) Error Probability Based Metrics: In a number of works
on physical layer security, secure transmission schemes are
designed based on constraining the bit error rate at the legiti-
mate receiver and the eavesdropper to pre-specified threshold
values. This leads to the definition of a performance metric
called “security gap,” which quantifies the minimum required
difference between the received SNR values at Bob and Eve
to ensure that the bit error rate (BER) at Bob is smaller than a
threshold while that at the Eve’s receiver is larger than another
threshold [30]. One may note that imposing a high BER at the
eavesdropper does not satisfy any of the requirements given in
Table I. However, security gap serves as a practical measure
of secrecy in a number of applications such as explicit and
implementable code design for physical layer secrecy. Some
studies (e.g., [31]) consider the difference in the signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper as a secrecy metric as well. This is
also a weak notion, which does not guarantee secrecy in an
information theoretic sense.
III. GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNELS WITH
FINITE-ALPHABET INPUTS
The secrecy capacity achieving input distribution over a
Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel is proved to be Gaussian
[18]. However, since Gaussian signals take on a continuum
of values, their detection complexity is considerably high. In
addition, noting that Gaussian signals are unbounded, they
have high peak to average power ratios and they cannot
be generated in practice. Accordingly, Gaussian signaling is
not used in practice, and instead the transmission is carried
out with the aid of discrete inputs drawn from standard
constellations such as phase shift keying (PSK) or quadrature
amplitude modulation (QAM). Hence, it is important to study
the implications of discrete signaling in the context of physical
layer security.
As a first step in studying physical layer security under
the finite-alphabet input assumption, the impacts of standard
constellations on the achievable secrecy rates of Gaussian
wiretap channels are determined in [32] and [33]. In [32], the
authors evaluate the constellation-constrained secrecy capacity
and highlight an important behavioral difference between
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Fig. 2: Capacity of an AWGN channel with Gaussian and
constellation-constrained inputs.
finite-alphabet (e.g., PSK and QAM) and Gaussian inputs, that
is, for a fixed noise variance at Eve, the secrecy rate curves
for PSK or QAM plotted against the SNR have global maxima
at finite SNR values. Investigation of the secrecy capacity of
the pulse amplitude modulation (PAM) inputs over a degraded
Gaussian wiretap channel in [33] leads to a similar conclusion.
In addition, the authors in [33] demonstrate that when finite
constellations are employed, using all the available power
for the information bearing signal transmission may not be
optimal. The reason behind these observations has its roots
in the mutual information expressions. That is, the capacity
under an average power constraint over an AWGN channel is
given by
C = log2(1 + SNR) (9)
in bits per complex dimension, and it is an unbounded
function of the SNR. On the other hand, the capacity of the
constellation-constrained AWGN channel can be calculated as
[34]
I(X;Y ) = log2 ∣X ∣ −EX,Y ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ log2 ∑x′∈X
pY ∣X′(y∣x′)
pY ∣X(y∣x)
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭, (10)
where X is a constellation set and ∣X ∣ denotes its cardinality.
Dissimilar to the capacity expression in (9), the mutual infor-
mation term in (10) converges to log2 ∣X ∣ at high SNRs (see
Fig. 2). This means that by increasing the transmit power, the
mutual information terms I(X;Y ) and I(X;Z) (calculated
using (10)) will reach their saturation value, and the secrecy
rate drops to zero. This is also exemplified in Fig. 3, where
the secrecy rates are obtained by evaluating the difference
of the mutual information terms corresponding to the main
and eavesdropper’s channels, under the assumption that the
SNR at the eavesdropper (denoted by SNRe) is lower than
the legitimate receiver’s SNR (denoted by SNRb) by 1.5 dB.
This also clarifies that using all the available transmit power
for information transmission in the high SNR regime is not
optimal [33]. Furthermore, it can be observed from Fig. 3
that higher secrecy rates are achieved over Gaussian wiretap
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channels by increasing the modulation orders. This is because
by increasing the modulation order, roughly speaking, the
distribution of the channel input can be made to resemble
the optimal Gaussian signal more closely for a wider range
of SNRs.
The impact of output quantization on the secrecy rate of
binary-input Gaussian wiretap channels is investigated in [35].
It is shown through a theoretical analysis that when the legiti-
mate receiver has unquantized inputs and the eavesdropper has
(binary) quantized outputs, higher secrecy rates are achievable
with respect to the case where both receivers have binary
quantized or unquantized outputs.
To conclude this section, we note that, while it may be
tempting to argue that, as in the case of transmission over
an AWGN channel with no security considerations, one can
design general transmission schemes using Gaussian code-
books and simply adopt the ideas to the case of inputs from
standard constellations (e.g., PSK, QAM, etc.), this approach
does not extend in a straightforward manner to the case of
physical layer security. The optimal transmit signal design
strategies under the Gaussian input assumption lead to con-
siderable losses when applied to inputs drawn from standard
constellations. For instance, it is shown in [33] that the optimal
power allocation strategy with PAM inputs is in sharp contrast
to that of Gaussian inputs. This motivates development of new
algorithms and ideas for practical constellation-constrained
channels to achieve security at the physical layer.
IV. FADING AND MULTI-ANTENNA WIRETAP CHANNELS
DRIVEN BY FINITE-ALPHABET INPUTS
Fading introduces new potentials for securing communica-
tions at the physical layer. Specifically, randomness due to
channel fluctuations can be exploited opportunistically by a
transmitter to guarantee secrecy even in the scenarios where
the eavesdropper possesses a higher SNR (on average) than the
legitimate receiver. Dissimilar to the Gaussian wiretap channel
where Gaussian inputs are secrecy capacity achieving, in the
presence of fading, discrete signaling may achieve higher
6Fig. 4: MIMO wiretap channel.
secrecy rates. For instance, it is shown in [36] that, when
Bob’s channel gain is on average worse than that of Eve’s,
QAM inputs achieve higher secrecy rates at low and moderate
SNR regimes. This is because the discrete nature of QAM
inputs limits the leakage at the eavesdropper whose channel
is unusually good. At sufficiently high SNRs, however, the
secrecy rate with QAM inputs drops to zero similar to what
is observed for the case of Gaussian wiretap channels.
Taking advantage of the spatial degrees of freedom intro-
duced by multi-antenna transmission can serve as an efficient
solution to prevent secrecy rate of standard constellations from
dropping to zero at high SNRs. In the remainder of this section,
we focus on a system model where Alice, Bob and Eve are
equipped with Nt, NB and NE antennas, as depicted in Fig.
4. The received signals are given by
y = HBx + ny, (11)
z = HEx + nz, (12)
where HB and HE are the channel matrices correspond-
ing to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respec-
tively, while ny and nz denote circularly symmetric complex
AWGN vectors, elements of which are independent and followCN (0, σ2ny) and CN (0, σ2nz), respectively.
Transmit precoding and artificial noise injection serve as
important approaches for enhancing secrecy [7]. Via precod-
ing, it is possible to strengthen (or weaken) the transmitted
signals in certain directions. Accordingly, it can be used as
an effective tool to increase the quality difference between
the signals received at the legitimate receiver and the eaves-
dropper. Beamforming is a special case of precoding where the
transmitter is restricted to using rank-one signals. It has a lower
complexity with respect to the general transmit precoding
solutions, achieved at the price of some performance loss.
Furthermore, injection of artificial noise [37] can degrade
the reception at the eavesdropper effectively while having no
(or minimal) effect on the signal received at the legitimate
receiver. We also note that, to take advantage of the potentials
offered by channel fading, the transmitter needs a certain level
of knowledge on the CSI of both channels.
In what follows, we review the existing solutions for secure
transmission over MIMO wiretap channels with finite-alphabet
inputs under different CSIT assumptions.
A. Transmit Signal Design with Full CSI
The most optimistic assumption regarding the transmitter’s
CSI knowledge is availability of perfect instantaneous realiza-
tions of the channel matrices HB and HE . This assumption
is justifiable in the scenarios where Eve is an authorized
user in the network, however, she should be kept ignorant
about the confidential messages transmitted from Alice to
Bob. In this case, the transmitter can take advantage of the
full CSI knowledge to design a precoder, which results in the
largest quality difference between the signals received at the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper.
With the aid of the perfect CSI corresponding to both
channels, a generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD)
precoding solution is proposed in [38] using which the MIMO
multi-antenna eavesdropper (MIMOME) channel is converted
into a bank of parallel channels, and a power allocation
strategy is formulated to maximize the achievable secrecy rate.
The necessary conditions for optimum transmit precoding
is derived in [39], and it is demonstrated that the GSVD
precoding [38] is suboptimal. Alternatively, a gradient descent
optimization is proposed in which the precoder matrices are
updated with steps proportional to the gradient of the instanta-
neous secrecy rate. Furthermore, it is shown that transmission
along the null-space of the eavesdropper’s channel is the
optimal secure transmission strategy at the high-SNR regime.
This is because, with a precoder matrix along the null-
space of the eavesdropper’s channel, her achievable rate is
suppressed to zero, and when the SNR is sufficiently high,
the rate at the legitimate receiver approaches the maximum
value that can be achieved with the use of specific finite-
alphabet inputs, which guarantees that the secrecy rate is
maximized. However, it should be noted that, when the number
of transmit antennas is less than or equal to the number of
antennas at the eavesdropper, it is not possible to suppress the
Eve’s information rate by transmitting along the null-space of
HE . Therefore, to maximize the secrecy rates, only part of
the available power should be allocated to data transmission.
Given Nt > NB , the authors in [39] suggest to use the excess
power for transmission of an artificial noise signal along the
null-space of HB so as to prevent the secrecy rates from
dropping to zero.
Fig. 5 compares the achievable secrecy rates by the schemes
proposed in [38] and [39] for a wiretap channel with Nt = 2,
NB = 1 and NE = 1, and fixed channels given by1
hB = [0.5128 − 0.3239j −0.8903 − 0.0318j] , (13)
hE = [0.3880 + 1.2024j −0.9825 + 0.5914j] . (14)
The precoding approach proposed in [39] outperforms the
GSVD-based precoding [38]. This improved performance is
1This example has also been considered in [39] and [40].
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attained at the price of increased computational complexity.
Furthermore, comparing the results given in Fig. 5 with
those of Fig. 3 for QPSK inputs over the Gaussian wiretap
channel reveals the advantages offered by fading and CSI-
based precoding approaches.
An important conclusion that can be drawn from the re-
sults in [38] and [39] is that, as in the case of non-fading
channels, the structure of the optimal precoders under the
finite-alphabet input assumption is different from that of the
optimal precoders for Gaussian inputs. For example, over
MISO multi-antenna eavesdropper (MISOME) channels, the
optimal transmission strategy is beamforming along the eigen-
vector corresponding to the largest generalized eigenvalue of(Hb,He) [40]. However, these precoders (which correspond to
signaling with rank one covariance), when applied to finite-
alphabet inputs, undergo a considerable loss with respect to
the precoders specifically optimized for this case (see, e.g.,
Fig. 7 in [39]).
As an alternative method to design a suboptimal precoder,
one may also replace the secrecy capacity with practical met-
rics (as opposed to those ensuring secrecy in an information-
theoretic sense) such as SINR-based metrics. For instance,
the authors in [41] design artificial noise beamformers, which
serve as constructive interference to the legitimate receiver
(improving Bob’s SINR) while disrupting the reception at
the eavesdropper (degrading Eve’s SINR). In Table II, we
summarize the precoder design approaches with full CSI.
B. Perfect MCSI and Statistical ECSI
While availability of perfect ECSI at the transmitter may
be practical in some limited scenarios, in general, it is highly
challenging to obtain it instantaneously. A more practical
assumption regarding CSIT is availability of perfect MCSI
along with the statistical ECSI at the transmitter. On the other
hand, the precoder design in this scenario is not as effective as
those carried out with the perfect knowledge of both channels.
In other words, with the absence of the instantaneous ECSI,
precoding is not as forceful in suppressing the reception at
the eavesdropper. For instance, transmission along the null-
space of the eavesdropper’s channel is not even possible in
this scenario.
An example of secure transmission schemes under per-
fect MCSI and statistical ECSI is given in [43] where the
authors consider a MISOME channel and define a practical
secrecy metric (instead of an information theoretic one), which
quantifies the symbol error probability of the confidential
data, and show that in the absence of artificial noise, secrecy
diversity (i.e., the high-SNR slope of their defined metric)
vanishes. This result underlines the importance of artificial
noise injection in these scenarios.
Artificial noise-aided transmit precoding strategies with the
objective of maximizing the secrecy rate are proposed in [44]–
[47]. In [44], the authors employ naive beamforming along
with the artificial noise injection while considering single-
antenna receivers. The strategy proposed in [39], on the other
hand, relies on an iterative maximization of an approximation
to the instantaneous secrecy rate. In both of these studies, it
is shown that the optimal schemes allocate only a fraction of
the total power for signal transmission at high SNRs. Hence,
the remaining power is employed for artificial noise injection.
It is shown in [45] that jointly optimizing the precoder
matrix and portion of the power allocated to the artificial
noise outperforms the solutions which rely on optimizing the
precoder only. Moreover, inspired by the idea proposed in [46],
a generalized artificial noise aided transmission is introduced
in [47], which guarantees high secrecy rates for the scenarios
with Nt < NE for which injection of artificial noise along the
null-space of the main channel is not possible. A summary of
the existing solutions for the scenarios with perfect MCSI and
statistical ECSI at the transmitter is given in Table III.
C. Perfect MCSI Only
In the scenarios with a passive eavesdropper, a realistic
assumption is that the transmitter does not know anything
about the eavesdropper’s channel. Under this assumption, [48]
and [49] propose a secure transmission strategy referred to as
directional modulation, in which the amplitude and the phase
of the transmit signal are adjusted by varying the length of the
reflector antennas for each symbol. This scrambles the PSK
symbols in all the directions other than that of the legitimate
receiver. Other strategies for securing communications without
the knowledge of the eavesdropper’s channel are proposed in
[50] and [52]. Zhang et al. develop a Tomlinson-Harashima
precoding in [50] where the transmitter allocates part of its
power in order to achieve a target mean squared error (MSE)
at the legitimate receiver, and the remaining power is used to
transmit artificial noise to degrade the eavesdropper’s recep-
tion. In [52], a secure space-time block coding (STBC) scheme
is proposed, which enables the legitimate receiver to perform
separable decoding, while requiring an exhaustive maximum
likelihood (ML) detection at the eavesdropper. Furthermore,
the authors combine this scheme with artificial noise injection
to ensure a high uncoded BER at Eve. In [53], the authors
propose a practical precoded orthogonal STBC method for
MISO wireless networks where space-time codewords are
8TABLE II: Precoder design with full CSI.
Authors System Model Contributions
S. Bashar et al. [38] MIMOME Proposes a GSVD-based precoding algorithm.
Y. Wu et al. [39] MIMOME Derives the necessary conditions for optimality of the precoder matrix and
develop a gradient descent based precoder optimization algorithm.
M. R. A. Khandaker et al.
[41]
MISO, multiple
Eves
Designs artificial noise which is constructive to the legitimate receiver and
destructive to the eavesdroppers.
TABLE III: Precoder design with perfect MCSI and statistical ECSI.
Authors System Model Contributions
T. V. Nguyen et al. [43] MISOME Defines a weak notion of secrecy based on symbol error probability and quantifies
the impact of artificial noise injection with beamforming on diversity order.
S. Bashar et al. [44] MISOSE Employs a naive beamforming with the aid of MCSI only along with a power
optimization using perfect MCSI and statistical ECSI. The excess power is used
for artificial noise injection in the null-space of HB .
Y. Wu et al. [39] MIMOME Develops an iterative algorithm for precoder design and allocate the excess power
to inject artificial noise along the null-space of HB .
S. Rezaei Aghdam and T.
M. Duman [47]
MIMOME Proposes a joint precoder and (generalized) artificial noise optimization algorithm.
precoded by a matrix that minimizes the error rate at the
legitimate receiver and a pre-equalization step is added to take
security requirements into account. Table IV summarizes the
existing transmit signal design approaches under perfect MCSI
and no ECSI at the transmitter.
D. Statistical MCSI and ECSI
While most of the existing physical layer security solu-
tions rely on the assumption that the transmitter is capable
of estimating at least the instantaneous main CSI, in some
scenarios (e.g., for fast fading channels), it may be difficult
for the transmitter to track the rapidly varying channel coef-
ficients. For these cases, the impact of the discrete inputs on
the achievable secrecy rates is analyzed in [54]. Under the
assumption that both channels are doubly correlated, using
the knowledge of transmit and receive correlation matrices,
transmit signal design algorithms are proposed in [55] to
maximize the resulting achievable secrecy rates. The results
in [55] reveal that jointly optimizing the precoder matrix and
artificial noise results in increased achievable secrecy rates
with respect to precoding without artificial noise injection. The
existing studies on MIMO wiretap channels with statistical
CSI are summarized in Table V.
We now compare the secrecy rates achieved by differ-
ent transmit signal design approaches under different CSIT
assumptions. In particular, we overview the results for the
scenarios with perfect or statistical CSI at the transmitter.
When perfect CSI is available, each element of HB and HE are
modeled as independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) withCN (0, σ2B) and CN (0, σ2E), respectively. When considering
the statistical CSI corresponding to the main channel or the
eavesdropper’s channel, a commonly adopted model in the
literature employs doubly correlated channels with
HB = Ψ1/2rB HˆBΨ1/2tB , HE = Ψ1/2rE HˆEΨ1/2tE , (15)
where the elements of HˆB and HˆE are i.i.d., and the transmit-
ter is capable of acquiring the transmit and receive correlation
matrices, i.e., Ψtb, Ψte, Ψrb and Ψre, from the long-term
statistics of the channel. Perfect instantaneous CSI is available
at both receivers.
Fig. 6 demonstrates the achievable secrecy rates by different
transmission schemes over a MIMOME wiretap channel with
Nt = 4 and NB = NE = 2. Correlation matrices are assumed
to have exponentially decaying entries as[Ψt(ρ)]ij = ρt∣i−j∣, i, j = 1,2, . . . ,Nt, (16)[Ψr(ρ)]mk = ρr ∣m−k∣, m, k = 1,2, . . . ,NB (or, NE).
(17)
It is demonstrated that the precoder design using a gradient
descent optimization approach [39], [47] is a promising strat-
egy for maximizing the secrecy rates. Fig. 6 also reveals the
importance of CSIT. When perfect CSI corresponding to the
eavesdropper is available at the transmitter, it is possible to
construct precoders, which are aligned with the null-space of
the eavesdropper’s channel. By this means, the achievable rate
of the eavesdropper can be suppressed to zero. Furthermore,
even when only the statistical CSI of the eavesdropper along
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Fig. 6: Secrecy rates with different transmit signal design
algorithms under different CSIT assumptions.
9TABLE IV: Transmit signal design with perfect MCSI and no ECSI.
Authors System Model Contributions
A. Kalantari et al. [48],
[49]
MIMOME Steers the array beam such that the phase of the PSK modulated signal is
scrambled in directions other than Bob’s.
L. Zhang et al. [50] MIMOME Proposes a nonlinear Tomlinson-Harashima precoding along with along with
artificial noise injection.
S. A. A. Fakoorian et al.
[52]
MIMOME
Nt = NB = 2,
NE ≥ 1
Designs a STBC which results in a high BER for Eve and a low BER for Bob.
J. M. Hamamreh et al.
[53]
MISOSE
Nt = 4,NB =
NE = 1
Proposes a precoded orthogonal STBC which minimizes BER at Bob and is
capable of satisfying the security requirements.
TABLE V: Transmit signal design with statistical MCSI and ECSI.
Authors System Model Contributions
M. Girnyk et al. [54] MIMOME Derives a large system approximation for secrecy rates under arbitrary channel
inputs and quantifies them for Gaussian and finite-alphabet inputs.
S. Rezaei Aghdam and T.
M. Duman [55]
MIMOME Proposes precoding and artificial noise injection approaches with the knowledge
of correlation matrices.
with perfect CSI of the main user is available, high secrecy
rates are still achievable with the aid of appropriately designed
artificial noise injection strategies. However, in the absence
of instantaneous CSI, the precoder matrices designed with
the knowledge of correlation matrices are not capable of
preventing the ergodic secrecy rates from dropping to zero
at high SNRs. In other words, since statistical CSI does not
provide sufficient degrees of freedom to take advantage of
fading for improving secrecy, the behavior is similar to that
in AWGN channels described in Section III.
E. Transmit Signal Design Based on Channel Reciprocity
A group of transmission strategies in the literature of physi-
cal layer security rely on the assumption of channel reciprocity,
that is, the transmitter and the legitimate receiver observe
the same channel, simultaneously. For systems working in
time division duplex (TDD) mode, this property can be used
to enable the transmitter to obtain the MCSI using pilot
signals transmitted from the legitimate receiver. In [56], a
secure transmission scheme is proposed over a MIMO wiretap
channel under the assumption that no training signals are
transmitted by Alice, and hence, no CSI is available at Bob or
Eve. Alice realizes an orthogonal space-time block coded PSK
transmission and uses the CSI she obtains from the reverse
channel estimation to design a phase shifting precoder, which
compensates the phase shift by the channel. Therefore, Bob
can recover the transmitted messages with no need to CSI.
On the other hand, Eve who observes an independent channel
can only recover the information with non-coherent detection,
ensuring positive secrecy rates over MIMO wiretap channels.
In the scenarios with channel reciprocity, when channel
estimation is carried out both in the forward (from Alice
to Bob) and the reverse (from Bob to Alice) directions, the
channel between Alice and Bob can serve as a source of
common randomness, which can further improve secrecy. This
common randomness is used in [57] for generation of a
random phase sequence, which is then used to manipulate
the transmitted symbols (by simply multiplying them with
the obtained random phase terms). Since the eavesdropper is
unable to find out these random phase values, an enhanced
secrecy is attained. In [58], the authors propose a secure
Alamouti scheme using channel reciprocity. In their proposed
approach, after performing a two-way probing, the legitimate
users exchange a secret key based on their received signal
strength indicator, and this key is used for rotation of the PSK
constellation from one codeword to the next. A cross-layer
analysis of secure MIMO transmission is given in [59]. It is
shown that when using the main channel as a (not necessarily
secret) key between the legitimate users, complexity of the
eavesdropper’s decoding of the legitimate receiver’s message
is as hard as solving standard lattice problems, and it grows
exponentially in the number of transmit antennas.
F. Performance-Complexity Trade-off in Transmit Signal De-
sign
The iterative algorithms proposed in [39] and [47] for
optimizing the precoder matrix are shown to offer promising
results in terms of the achievable secrecy rates. However, their
implementation complexity may be too high for some practical
applications. There are two main reasons for this high com-
putational complexity. First, both the mutual information and
its gradient lack closed-form expressions. Therefore, Monte
Carlo simulations need to be utilized to evaluate them, which
require averaging over a large number of noise realizations in
order to maintain a high level of accuracy. More importantly,
evaluation of the mutual information and the minimum MSE
(MMSE) term involves additions over the modulation signal
space, which grows exponentially with the number of trans-
mit antennas, resulting in a prohibitively high computational
complexity when the number of transmit antennas is large.
Different strategies are proposed for lowering the compu-
tational complexity associated with the transmit signal design
for secrecy under the finite-alphabet input assumption. The
authors in [39] and [45] derive closed-form approximations
for the secrecy rate expressions using bounds on the mutual
information. While the former employs the bounds given in
[60], the latter approximates the mutual information using
the cut-off rate expression. The authors in [61]-[62] derive
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asymptotic secrecy rates in a regime where the numbers of
antennas at the transmitter and both receivers grow infinitely
large with a constant ratio. Maximization of this expression
is shown to yield a satisfactory performance even in the
cases of small number of antennas. The authors in [63] and
[47] propose per-group precoding strategies under perfect
and partial CSIT assumptions, respectively. In these works,
the channels are diagonalized, and the precoder matrices are
designed by grouping the transmit antennas and designing the
precoder matrix for each group, independently.
G. Secure Spatial Modulation
Spatial modulation and space shift keying (SSK) are rela-
tively new MIMO transmission schemes, which rely on trans-
mitting information via active antenna indices. Similar to the
amplitude or phase modulation schemes, in spatial modulation
and SSK, the channel inputs are drawn from discrete and
finite sets. More specifically, in spatial modulation [64], the
data bits are mapped onto two information carrying blocks: 1)
an antenna index selected from the set of transmit antennas,
and 2) a symbol drawn from a standard constellation. Space
shift keying is a special case of spatial modulation where no
amplitude of phase modulation is employed, i.e., the transmit
antenna index serves as the only information carrying unit
[65].
Different studies explore the advantages offered by spatial
modulation over state-of-the-art MIMO schemes (see [66] for
a comprehensive overview). Along with different application
areas of spatial modulation and SSK, studying these transmis-
sion schemes in the context of physical layer security has been
of recent interest. Secrecy capacity of spatial modulation for
the scenarios with two transmit antennas is studied in [67], and
the results are extended to MISOSE and MIMOME scenarios
in [68] and [69], respectively.
Different secure spatial modulation based transmission
schemes are also proposed with the aid of MCSI and ECSI
at the transmitter, and for systems with channel reciprocity. A
precoder optimization algorithm for maximizing secrecy rates
with SSK transmission using full CSI is proposed in [70].
The authors in [71] provide a precoder design and artificial
noise injection approach for securing spatial modulation for
the scenarios with passive eavesdroppers (with no ECSI at
the transmitter). The secrecy rates of spatial modulation with
artificial noise injection are characterized in [72]. While the
conventional artificial noise injection (similar to what is con-
sidered in [72]) requires multiple antennas to be activated, a
novel secure artificial noise aided transmission is introduced
in [73], which requires only two antennas to be activated
at each time instance. Existing secure transmit signal design
approaches for spatial modulation and SSK are summarized
in Table VI.
For the scenarios where channel reciprocity holds, a trans-
mit preprocessing technique is proposed in [74] under the
assumption that the training sequences are transmitted from
Bob to Alice, and no CSI is available at the receiver nodes. The
authors in [75] propose a dynamic antenna index assignment
based on the main channel when training is carried out at both
directions, which prevents an eavesdropper from obtaining the
antenna index assignment pattern.
V. MULTI-CARRIER WIRETAP CHANNELS WITH DISCRETE
INPUTS
A. OFDM Wiretap Channel
Orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) pro-
vides robustness against multipath channel fading and offers
flexibility in resource allocation. These features have made
OFDM a widely used technique in recent wireless standards
including 4G and 5G wireless systems. If there are no time
variations across an OFDM word (i.e., for slow fading), the
system can be modeled as a set of independent parallel
channels. It is proved in [77] that the secrecy capacity of
K independent parallel channels (as depicted in Fig. 7) is
achieved when each channel achieves its individual secrecy
capacity. For parallel Gaussian wiretap channels, the optimal
input is Gaussian distributed [78]. However, a more practical
study of OFDM wiretap channel is possible by assuming that
the data symbols belong to finite constellations.
An initial study on parallel Gaussian wiretap channels
under finite-alphabet inputs is reported in [33] where the
authors characterize the secrecy capacity with PAM signaling.
They also provide a mercury-waterfilling interpretation of the
optimal power allocation strategy. It is observed in [33] that
dissimilar to standard parallel Gaussian channels (with no
constraints on the input distribution), it may not be optimal to
use all the available power for PAM inputs. In [79], the OFDM
wiretap channel is studied with QAM inputs. After quantifying
the loss in the secrecy rates with respect to the scenarios with
Gaussian inputs, a bit loading strategy is proposed to minimize
this loss by assigning an appropriate number of bits to each
subchannel.
The sensitivity of OFDM based transmissions to frequency
synchronization errors can be exploited to achieve secure
transmission as well. The authors in [80] propose a secure
Fig. 7: OFDM wiretap channel modeled as set of independent
parallel channels. K ∶ number of subcarriers (i.e., the number
of parallel channels).
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TABLE VI: Transmit signal design for secure spatial modulation and SSK.
Paper System Model Contributions
S. Sinanovic et al. [67] Nt = 2, NB = NE = 1, No
CSI at the transmitter
Characterizes secrecy rates for spatial modulation and SSK transmission.
X. Guan et al. [68] MISOSE Evaluates the secrecy rates by deriving mutual information terms and proposes
a precoding with the aid of full CSI.
S. Rezaei Aghdam and T.
M. Duman [69]
MIMOME, No CSI at the
transmitter
Derives expressions for achievable secrecy rates with spatial modulation and
SSK schemes.
S. Rezaei Aghdam and T.
M. Duman [70]
MIMOME, Full CSI at the
transmitter
Develops an iterative precoder design algorithm.
F. Wu et al. [71] MIMOME, Nt > NB ,
MCSI at the transmitter
Proposes a precoder and artificial noise design algorithm.
L. Wang et al. [72] MIMOME, Nt > NB ,
MCSI at the transmitter
Characterizes the secrecy rates of artificial noise aided spatial modulation.
Z. Huang et al. [73] MIMOME, MCSI at the
transmitter.
Proposes an artificial noise aided secure quadrature spatial modulation with a
low hardware complexity.
OFDM transmission over reciprocal channels, which relies
on inducing carrier frequency offset that is pre-compensated
(using the transmitter’s knowledge on the MCSI) in such a
way that it is received without inter-carrier interference at the
legitimate receiver, while the reception at the eavesdropper
receiving the signal through an independent channel is con-
siderably degraded. In [81], an eavesdropping resilient OFDM
scheme is developed over reciprocal channels where Alice
performs a subcarrier interleaving using her knowledge on
the instantaneous MCSI. The legitimate receiver who is also
capable of acquiring the MCSI can obtain the interleaving
pattern and de-interleave the received signals. In contrast, the
eavesdropper cannot derive the interleaving pattern initiated by
the transmitter, and as a result, fails to acquire the transmitted
information.
Cyclic prefix is used in OFDM systems to avoid inter carrier
interference (ICI) incurred by multi-path channels. However,
using cyclic prefix makes the transmission vulnerable to cy-
clostationarity based attacks [51]. This temporal degrees of
freedom offered by the cyclic prefix can be used for artificial
noise injection so as to improve secrecy over OFDM wiretap
channels. In [82], a single-antenna OFDM wiretap channel
is considered and an artificial noise signal is inserted into
the time-domain signal (over the cyclic prefix samples). A
framework for joint optimization of the power allocated to
each subcarrier and artificial noise covariance matrix is also
proposed. In [83], Akitaya et al. study the application of time-
domain artificial noise injection in MIMOME OFDM systems.
The results in [82] and [83] demonstrate that this approach is
efficient for improving the secrecy rates in OFDM wiretap
channels.
Efficient resource allocation for secure OFDM systems is
formulated as a convex optimization problem in [84], and
solved assuming that the transmitter uses artificial noise to
combat an eavesdropper equipped with multiple antennas. Li et
al. [85] propose scrambling of data in the time domain after the
IFFT operation in order to improve physical layer security for
OFDM signals. This, in fact, corresponds to sending modified
constellation points (in terms of phase and amplitude) on each
sub-carrier. The authors in [88] introduce channel frequency
response based pre-coder and post-coder designs for enhancing
security in OFDM systems. Their solution relies on extracting
orthonormal matrices via singular value decomposition (SVD)
of the legitimate user’s channel frequency amplitude and using
it for shuffling OFDM sub-channels as well as for designing
the frequency-based precoder and post-coder. In [89], physical
layer security is studied for passive OFDM-based optical
networks where a scrambled precoding technique is utilized to
improve the security. The authors in [90] propose an efficient
approach to enhance secrecy in OFDM systems that relies
on employing an adaptive interleaver maximizing the overall
diversity gain delivered to the legitimate receiver. Hamamreh
et al. [86] propose an efficient physical layer security technique
for transmission of OFDM-based waveforms by developing
an optimal joint subcarrier index selection and adaptive in-
terleaver design to enhance the security and reliability of 5G
services. In order to provide QoS based security for OFDM
systems, channel shortening (CS) equalizer coefficients are
designed in [91] based on the legitimate receiver’s channel.
Specifically, CS is used at the transmitter in such a way that the
effective channel ensures no ISI at Bob, while causing ISI and
performance degradation at Eve. More recently, application
of deep learning for physical layer security in multi carrier
systems is studied in [87] where an adversary aims at sending
spurious data to the legitimate receiver.
Table VII summarizes important results on the study of
OFDM wiretap channels under the finite-alphabet input as-
sumption.
B. Filter-Bank Multicarrier Wiretap Channel
OFDM systems face important challenges when they are
adopted for more complex networks. For instance, it is
very difficult to establish full synchronization for the sig-
nals corresponding to different users in the base station in
an orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA)
network. Furthermore, OFDM introduces significant out of
band interference to other users when it is used to transmit
over a set of non-contiguous frequency bands as in cognitive
radio where transmission is limited to certain portions of the
band and 5G wireless systems [92].
Filter bank multicarrier (FBMC) modulation is shown to be
able to resolve the above problems by utilizing high quality fil-
ters for transmission, which makes it a potential candidate for
future networks including 5G. With this motivation, recently,
there has been some interest in the physical layer security
aspects of FBMC based networks, as well. In [93], the authors
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TABLE VII: OFDM wiretap channel with discrete inputs.
Paper Model Contributions
M. R. D. Rodrigues et al.
[33]
Parallel Gaussian Wiretap
Channels
Characterizes secrecy rates with PAM inputs and derive optimal power
allocation strategy.
F. Renna et al. [79] SISOSE Evaluates the secrecy rates for OFDM systems with QAM input constellations
and provides a bit-loading strategy.
M. Yusuf et al. [80] SISOSE with reciprocal main
channel
Suggests inducing carrier frequency offset which is pre-compensated at the
legitimate receiver.
H. Li et al. [81] SISOSE with reciprocal main
channel
Proposes subcarrier interleaving based on the MCSI which prevents
eavesdropper from de-interleaving the received signals.
H. Qin et al. [82] SISOSE Introduces a time-domain artificial noise injection approach and proposes a
joint optimization of data power and artificial noise covariance matrix.
T. Akitaya et al. [83] MIMOME Studies application time-domain artificial noise injection approach in
multi-antenna scenarios.
M. Yusuf et al. [90] SISOSE with reciprocal main
channel
Employs an interleaving whose pattern is adapted to the main channel.
J. M. Hamamreh et al.
[86]
SISOSE with reciprocal main
channel
Develops a joint optimal subcarrier index selection and adaptive interleaving
design to enhance the security and reliability
present a filter hopping FBMC approach for security. They
argue that the choices of filters for each symbol provide a
major degree of freedom for the FBMC waveforms, which can
be exploited for security purposes. Furthermore, a mismatch
in the receive filter results in violation of the orthogonality of
different subcarriers, and it causes the energy of a transmit
symbol at a certain subcarrier to spread into the adjacent
subcarriers. This effect is shown to be significant even for a
slight mismatch of the filters between the transmitter and the
receiver [93], hence it can be exploited for providing physical
layer security. For instance, in a practical system, Alice and
Bob can exchange their filter designs by exchanging keys or
using a pre-shared sequence of filters. Then, the transmitter can
change the filters continuously, and make it extremely difficult
for an eavesdropper to find the exact filter being used, hence
securing the transmission.
VI. SPREAD SPECTRUM TECHNIQUES FOR PHYSICAL
LAYER SECURITY
One of the potential methods for improving physical layer
security is spread spectrum (SS) communications. In this
method, a signal is spread over a frequency band such that the
resulting bandwidth is much wider than that of the original
signal. Historically, this method has been first used in mil-
itary applications to achieve transmission schemes with low
probability of intercept (LPI). Two main approaches in SS
communications are direct sequence spread-spectrum (DSSS)
and frequency-hopping spread-spectrum (FHSS).
FHSS involves hopping the carrier frequency of the out-
going signal in a predetermined fashion, which is known to
both the transmitter and the receiver [94]. In this way, it is
extremely difficult for an eavesdropper to monitor the resulting
spread spectrum signal. In DSSS, the outgoing symbol stream
gets multiplied by a symbol sequence called spreading code
which has a much smaller symbol duration, hence increasing
the bandwidth of the resulting signal. For the case where
multiple users share the same channel, they utilize different
spreading codes to distinguish their signals. In order to avoid
an eavesdropper to detect the signal, the spread signal can be
scrambled using a pseudo-noise (PN) sequence [95]. One of
the main differences between DSSS and traditional cryptog-
raphy methods (where the key space is very large) is that the
key space is limited by the available bandwidth.
Physical layer security of code division multiple access
(CDMA) systems is studied in [96] based on the use of
relatively long PN scrambling sequences. In most cases, Walsh
codes are used to generate channelization codes for this pur-
pose as they are easy to generate. The authors in [96] propose
a method to generate the scrambling sequences by using
advanced encryption standard (AES) operation. Specifically,
they design an AES-CDMA scheme secured against exhaustive
key-search attacks utilizing AES with three different key
sizes up to 256. We close this discussion by noting that,
while valid in practice, such spread spectrum based solutions
do not provide information theoretically (provable) secure
communications, unlike the physical layer security algorithms
being reviewed.
VII. CONSTELLATION CONSTRAINED MULTIUSER AND
COOPERATIVE WIRETAP CHANNELS
The concept of physical layer security has also been ex-
tended to multi-user and cooperative networks in recent years.
In addition to the numerous studies on the limits of secure
communications for scenarios with more than two receivers,
multiple transmitters and presence of relays/jammers/helpers
(see [7] for a survey), some recent focus has also been placed
on the practical constellation-constrained secure transmission
in these settings.
A. Multiuser and Multi-Eve Networks
1) Broadcast Channel with Confidential Messages: The
achievable rate region for a Gaussian broadcast channel with
confidential messages is characterized for discrete inputs in
[97]. In this scenario, the transmitter’s objective is to send
a common message to two receivers as well as to deliver a
confidential message to one of them. Dissimilar to [32] and
[33] where standard constellations are considered, in [97], the
symbols are allowed to be arbitrary, and the achievable secrecy
rate region is enlarged by optimizing the symbol positions and
the probability distribution of the symbols. The shrinkage of
the rate region due to employing PAM inputs is quantified
with respect to the optimal Gaussian inputs, and a number
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of important behavioral differences between these cases are
highlighted.
2) Multiple Access Channels: The authors in [98] focus
their attention on multiple access wiretap channels (as depicted
in Fig. 9) under the assumption that the users employ the
Alamouti STBC scheme. Specifically, they consider a case
where multiple transmitters communicate with one legitimate
receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper. Under the assump-
tion that the transmitter has the knowledge of the legitimate
user’s channel and does not know the eavesdropper’s chan-
nel gain, an artificial noise injection is proposed along the
null-space of the main channel, which is shown to provide
considerable improvements in the secrecy sum-rate.
3) Cognitive Radio Networks: The linear precoder design
for the cognitive multiple-access wiretap and the cognitive
multi-antenna wiretap channels with finite-alphabet inputs are
studied in [99] and [100], respectively. In [99], the authors
consider a setup in which two secondary-user transmitters
are communicating with a secondary-user receiver in the
presence of an eavesdropper and under interference thresh-
old constraints at the primary users. A two-layer precoding
algorithm is proposed using statistical CSI at the transmitters
to maximize the ergodic secrecy sum rate. In [100], on the
other hand, the authors study a scenario where a multi-antenna
secondary-user transmitter communicates with a multi-antenna
secondary-user receiver, and the communication is wiretapped
by a multi-antenna eavesdropper (Fig. 10). In this work, the
precoder matrix is optimized using an iterative algorithm (as-
suming statistical CSI of all the channels) so that the secrecy
rate of the secondary user is maximized while power leakage
to the primary user sharing the same frequency spectrum is
controlled.
4) Multi-Eavesdropper Scenarios: The authors in [101]
study a setup comprised of a source, a legitimate receiver
and multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers. They first obtain
an expression for an achievable secrecy rate, and then, under
the full CSI assumption, they optimize the transmit power
and the beamforming vector. The problem of power alloca-
tion for secrecy over MIMO wiretap channels with multiple
eavesdroppers is studied in [102]. Under the assumption that
the transmitter has perfect MCSI and statistical ECSI, the
proposed power allocation strategy gives non-zero secrecy
rates at high transmit powers. This is important because in the
absence of this power control strategy, secrecy rate decreases
with increasing transmit power, and it drops to zero when the
eavesdroppers’ SNRs become higher than a certain value.
Fig. 8: Broadcast channel with confidential messages [97].
Fig. 9: Multiple access wiretap channel studied in [98].
Fig. 10: Cognitive multiple-access wiretap channel studied in
[100].
B. Relay Channels and Cooperative Communications
Cooperation serves as an efficient method for enhancing
secrecy in wireless networks. In this context, along with the
studies conducted on secrecy capacity in various cooperative
scenarios, a number of recent studies focus on finite-alphabet
inputs. In this context, the secrecy rates achieved with decode-
and-forward (DF) relay beamforming under the finite-alphabet
input constraints are characterized in [103]. It is shown that by
optimizing the source power and also the relay weights using
the global CSI, it is possible to prevent the secrecy rates from
dropping to zero. The authors in [104] consider a cooperative
jamming network in presence of multiple eavesdroppers, and
develop a secure transmission scheme with finite-alphabet
inputs, which relies on a joint optimization of the artificial
noise (injected in the null-space of the relay to destination
links), and power allocation among the source and the relays.
The study in [105] considers secure transmission over a
MIMOME setup with the aid of a multi-antenna helper, which
transmits a jamming signal to degrade the signal received by
the eavesdropper. Similar to [104], a framework is provided
for joint optimization of the precoder matrix and power
allocation between the transmitter and the helper. Furthermore,
low-complexity transmit signal design schemes are developed
for both low and high SNR regimes. The authors in [106]
focus on the problem of secure transmission with cooperative
jamming via an untrusted relay. They propose a power efficient
secure DF-based cooperative communication technique and
demonstrate the efficacy of their scheme via simulations using
14
practical constellation-constrained inputs.
Table VIII summarizes the recent research results of secure
transmission over finite-input multi-user, multi-eavesdropper
and cooperative channels.
VIII. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY FOR NEXT
GENERATION WIRELESS SYSTEMS
With the advent of the 5G and beyond wireless commu-
nication systems, a tremendous growth is expected in the
number of connected devices. To meet the high traffic demand,
various technologies have emerged during the past years. For
instance, massive MIMO [107], millimeter wave (mmWave)
communication systems [108], full duplex transmission [115]
and non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) [116] have at-
tracted significant interest from researchers both in industry
and academia.
Exploiting large antenna arrays and taking advantage of
a spectrum from 30 GHz to 300 GHz away from the al-
most fully occupied spectral band have proven to provide
various benefits, which make these technologies among the
key enablers for the next generation wireless systems and
beyond. Along with the different aspects of massive MIMO
and mmWave communications, investigating their potential in
providing physical layer security has been of recent interest
(see e.g., [109]-[114]). The problem of linear precoder design
for large-scale (massive) MIMO wiretap channel under the
finite-alphabet input assumption is investigated in [63] where
GSVD-based precoders are shown to achieve the maximal
secrecy rate at high SNR values. The potential of large antenna
arrays to realize secure directional modulation at mmWave
frequencies is demonstrated in [117] where the proposed
solution relies on driving only a subset of antennas in the
array and choosing the switching configuration such that the
desired modulation symbols are received at the legitimate
receiver while scrambling the constellation in other (undesired)
directions. The authors in [118] propose an antenna selection-
aided secure mmWave transmission using a switched phased
array architecture in large-scale transmit antenna arrays. We
note that, different from the solution proposed in [117], which
requires modulation at the RF end, the scheme in [118] can
use traditional baseband modulation schemes.
Offering several advantages such as high throughput, low
latency and improved connectivity, NOMA is one of the key
enabling technologies for next generation wireless networks.
It relies on removing the orthogonality (which exists in the
conventional practical multiple access techniques), and as-
signing a specific resource block (e.g., time or frequency)
to more than one user. Investigating the security issues of
NOMA has been a topic of recent interest. For instance, the
secrecy performance of large-scale NOMA networks is studied
in [119] where their secrecy outage probability is derived for
both single-antenna and multi-antenna transmitter scenarios.
Proposing eavesdropping resilient transmission schemes with
NOMA (especially, under a discrete signaling assumption) is
an interesting research direction, which is left for future work
as also stated in [120].
Full duplex wireless communications is another promis-
ing technology, which is expected to lead to a considerable
increase in spectral efficiency. The main idea behind full
duplex communications is to enable the radios to transmit
and receive at the same time and within the same frequency
band. The research on physical layer security in the scenarios
where different nodes are capable of full duplex operation
is a hot research topic (for an overview, see [11, Section
VII]). However, only a limited number of the existing studies
focus their attention on the practical constellation-constrained
scenarios. One example of such studies is reported in [121]
where secure communications in presence of full duplex
relays is investigated under the assumption that the transmitter
employs an Alamouti-based rank-two beamforming scheme.
Waveform design for 5G has also been a topic of interest
during the past years. In addition to an increased bandwidth
efficiency and reduced inter-user interference, new waveforms
may also provide gains in terms of secrecy. For instance,
the authors in [122] propose a secure waveform design for
5G wireless systems referred to as orthogonal transform divi-
sion multiplexing (OTDM), which relies on replacing Fourier
transform blocks in conventional OFDM systems by new
blocks allowing for diagonalization of the main channel while
degrading the eavesdropper’s reception.
We conclude this section by noting that the relatively recent
paradigm of Internet of things (IoT) is expected to offer
connectivity to billions of devices and it will be a centerpiece
in the next generation wireless technologies including 5G. In
view of the fact that, IoT systems are expected to consist
of a large number of devices, the conventional cryptographic
solutions, which require key distribution and management,
may be too complex for implementation. Accordingly, physical
layer security techniques (especially, the ones with lower
complexities) can play an important role in safeguarding IoT.
A recent survey paper [123] provides a thorough discussion
of the potentials of physical layer security techniques and
pinpoints a number of candidate schemes that can serve as
an alternative or complement to the key-based solutions in
securing IoT communications.
IX. PRACTICAL WIRETAP CODE CONSTRUCTIONS
The achievability of the secrecy rates described in the
previous sections is proved with the aid of random coding
arguments, i.e., from an information theoretic point of view.
However, in practice, one needs to realize secure communica-
tions with the aid of practical codes. In this regard, explicit and
implementable code design for secrecy has also been a topic of
recent interest in the literature. In particular, error-correcting
codes have found a new role since the emergence of physical
layer security. Aside from providing reliable transmission,
carefully designed codes are also capable of securing the
transmitted messages against an eavesdropper. On the other
hand, it is challenging to design these codes because they are
required to meet two conflicting requirements: 1) they need
to add redundancy in order to counter the randomness of the
channel and provide reliable communication, and 2) in order
to offer a secure transmission, they need to maximize the
randomness perceived at the eavesdropper.
An important step towards designing codes for the wiretap
channel is choosing a metric for measuring security. In contrast
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TABLE VIII: Multi-user, multi-eavesdropper and cooperative secure transmission with discrete inputs.
Paper Network Contributions
Z. Mheich et al. [97] Broadcast channel with
confidential message
Characterizes secrecy rate region with PAM inputs and enhances it by
optimizing symbol positions and the joint probability distribution.
T. Allen et al. [98] MAC Wiretap Develops a secure Alamouti transmission with artificial noise injection
with perfect MCSI and statistical ECSI.
J. Jin et al. [99] Cognitive MAC Wiretap A two-layer precoding is proposed using statistical CSI to maximize
secrecy sum-rate.
W. Zeng et al. [100] Cognitive Multi-Antenna
Wiretap
Proposes an iterative precoder optimization algorithm with statistical CSI.
K. Cao et al. [101] MISO Wiretap with Multiple
Multi-Antenna Eavesdroppers
Studies joint optimization of beamforming vector and transmitting power
with full CSI.
S. Vishwakarma et al.
[102]
MIMO Wiretap with
Multiple Eavesdroppers
Employs a power allocation strategy with perfect MCSI and statistical
ECSI.
S. Vishwakarma et al.
[103]
DF Relaying in Presence of
Multiple Eavesdroppers
Optimizes the source power and the relay weights with the aid of full CSI
so that the secrecy rate is maximized.
K. Cao et al. [104] Cooperative Jamming
Network in Presence of
Multiple Eavesdroppers
Provides a joint optimization of the artificial noise and the power allocated
between the source and the relays.
K. Cao et al. [105] MIMOME and a
Multi-Antenna Helper
Proposes a joint optimization of precoder and power allocation between
the source and the helper
H. M. Furqan et al.
[106]
Cooperative communications
with untrusted relay
Proposes a destination-assisted jamming for improving secrecy and power
efficiency.
to measuring reliability where probability of error is being
used as a universally accepted metric, there are multiple
metrics for quantifying secrecy for this scenario as listed in
Table I. Computation of these metrics for explicit finite length
coding schemes, however, has been limited to some specific
channels2. One example is [124] in which the authors apply
semantic secrecy to a finite length Reed-Muller code used over
a binary erasure channel (BEC). For AWGN channels, a BER
based metric called security gap (as mentioned in Section
II-D2) is widely used by the research community, which is
easily applicable to all practical coding schemes, however, its
relation to the information theoretic notions is not established
in a rigorous manner.
An analytical definition of security gap, which is nothing but
the difference between the qualities (SNRs) of the main and
the eavesdropper’s channels, can be given as follows. Let us fix
two threshold values for the maximum desired BER over the
main channel (denoted by PmaxB ≤ 12 ) and and the minimum
desired BER at the eavesdropper (denoted by PminE > 0).
Then, the security gap equals to the difference between the
SNR values corresponding to these two, i.e., SNRB −SNRE
measured in dBs. For AWGN channels without feedback, this
value must be greater than zero in order to result in a positive
secrecy capacity (which equals to the difference between the
capacities of the main and the eavesdropper’s channels [18]).
Small security gaps are desirable because they provide secrecy
even with a small degradation of the eavesdropper’s channel
with respect to the main one.
The major shortcoming of the above BER-based analysis
is that it assumes that if Pmineve ≈ 0.5, then Eve cannot
extract any information about the secret message. However,
if there exists a statistical correlation between the bit errors or
between the Eve’s observation and the transmitted message,
the amount of leaked information will not be zero. The
2The authors in [139] provide a coding scheme for an AWGN channel,
which satisfy strong secrecy using capacity approaching codes of infinite
length and hash functions.
authors in [129] employ tools from cryptography literature
to eliminate such correlations. Specifically, they propose the
use of substitution permutation networks (SPNs) without any
secret key to satisfy the strict avalanche criterion (SAC) and
the bit independence criterion (BIC). The required SPNs can
be implemented efficiently [129], hence they can be applied
to the message bits before the encoding stage. Therefore, one
can design practical coding schemes, which result in BERs
very close to 0.5 with no (or, small) correlation at Eve.
The general coding scheme for physical layer security is
the randomized encoding proposed by Wyner in [15] to prove
that there exists a code that achieves the secrecy capacity of
the degraded wiretap channel. This method is also known as
coset-coding studied further in the subsequent literature, e.g.,
in [125] and [126]. In this method, the all-zero message is
mapped to a linear block code C, with the generator matrix
G, and a non-zero message s = [s1, s2, ..., sk] is mapped to the
coset obtained by adding the n-tuple s1h1 + s2h2 + ...+ skhk
to all the codewords in C where hi’s are linearly independent
n-tuples outside C. Assuming hi’s form a matrix H of size
k × n, the transmitted codeword through the channel is
c = [s v] [H
G
] (18)
where v = [v1, v2, ..., vr] denotes the random bit vector used
for choosing a codeword in the corresponding coset uniformly
randomly. Fig. 11 illustrates this method where the small
code is denoted by C and cij denotes the ith codeword in
the jth coset. We note that in conventional (non-stochastic)
encoding, the leakage of information about the secret message
to Eve, H(SK ∣Zn), is equal to the leakage of the codewords
H(cn∣Zn) [124] since there is a one-to-one mapping between
the messages and the codewords. In the randomized encoding
scheme, however, this is not true anymore since different
codewords may represent the same message.
Application of lattice codes to the Gaussian wiretap channel
is studied in [127] where the authors define an alternative
security metric (called secrecy gain), which is related to the
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Fig. 11: Illustration of the coset coding scheme.
theta series of lattices and shows the amount of confusion
at the eavesdropper. Without introducing a decoding method,
they evaluate the performance of different lattices based on
the secrecy gain. The confusion at the eavesdropper in [127]
is the result of using a random lattice in addition to the lattice
that is responsible for transmitting the original message. As a
further development, the authors in [128] prove the existence
of lattices that are semantically secure over the Gaussian
wiretap channel.
The authors in [137] and [138] provide a lower bound on
the mutual information between the secret message and the
Eve’s observation. They utilize this lower bound to quantify
the equivocation for finite length codes for Gaussian wiretap
channels. Specifically, they use finite length LDPC codes and
demonstrate certain achievable points in the equivocation-rate
region. In [136], the level of security at the physical layer
is assessed from an information theoretic perspective while
taking into account the constraints of practical transmissions
over realistic wireless wiretap channels, i.e., by considering
practical codes with finite length, discrete modulation formats
and channels with fading.
Several practical coding schemes aiming directly at re-
ducing the security gap are also proposed in the literature.
Specifically, punctured LDPC codes are exploited for physical
layer security in [30]. [130] demonstrates how non-systematic
codes can be effective to reduce the resulting security gap,
while [131] applies different techniques including scrambling,
concatenation, and hybrid automatic repeat-request to LDPC
and BCH codes in order to further reduce the security gap.
Concatenation of polar and LDPC codes are proposed in
[133]. Coset codes based on convolutional and turbo codes
are constructed in [132] and [134] for physical layer security.
Moreover, application of serially concatenated low density
generator matrix (SCLDGM) codes to the randomized scheme
is studied in [135].
Authors in [139] introduce a method which provides strong
secrecy for the Gaussian wiretap channel by means of hash
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Fig. 12: The resulting security gaps from different coding
schemes. The parameters n, k and r denote length of a code,
number of data bits and number of random bits, respectively.
S means scrambling has been applied. The results are taken
from [132], [135] and [141].
functions and capacity approaching channel codes of infinite
length. Using this scheme, it is also possible to quantify the
level of leakage obtained for a fixed block length. Finally,
[140] provides the maximal secrecy rate over a wiretap channel
subject to reliability and secrecy constraints at a given block
length.
Table IX summarizes the existing practical coding schemes
for Gaussian wiretap channel along with their main contribu-
tions. Furthermore, Fig. 12 demonstrates several representative
security gaps from some of these practical coding schemes3.
One can see that when a BER of 0.5 is desired at Eve, security
gaps as small as 1 dB can be obtained using carefully designed
codes of length 104 or longer.
In addition to the Gaussian wiretap channels, some efforts
are also made to develop practical coding schemes for fading
wiretap channels. The authors in [142] and [143] propose
polar coding schemes for achieving secrecy over block fading
wiretap channels. In [142], a secure coding scheme is designed
with the aid of instantaneous MCSI and ECSI, while the polar
coding approach proposed in [143] relies on statistical CSI of
both channels. Application of algebraic lattice codes is also
proposed over block fading wiretap channels. For instance,
a sequence of non-random lattice codes is developed in [144]
that achieve strong secrecy and semantic security over ergodic
fading channels.
We emphasize that the easy-to-compute property of security
gap makes it a widely used metric in majority of the aforemen-
tioned code designs, which try to avoid potential complexities
associated with computing the original information-theoretic
metrics for finite-length scenarios. Despite some limited efforts
such as [138] in providing a lower bound for information-
3RSCCC stands for randomized serially concatenated convolutional codes,
RC stands for randomized convolutional codes and RSCLDGM corresponds
to randomized SCLDGM codes.
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TABLE IX: Practical coding schemes aiming at reducing the security gap over AWGN channel.
Paper Secure coding scheme Contributions
D. Klinc et al. [30] Punctured LDPC codes Proposes puncturing information bits in LDPC codes in order to
confuse Eve.
M. Baldi et al. [130] Non-systematic codes Makes use of scrambling technique at encoding which amplifies the
resulting errors at decoding stage.
M. Baldi et al. [131] Coding with scrambling,
concatenation, and HARQ
Investigates different techniques to reduce the resulting security gaps.
Y. X. Zhang et al. [133] Polar-LDPC concatenated
codes
Evaluates performance of a serially concatenated coding scheme
consists of polar and LDPC codes.
A. Nooraiepour and T. M.
Duman [132]
Randomized convolutional
and turbo codes
Constructs coset codes based on convolutional and turbo codes using
dual codes.
theoretic metrics (Table I), the literature of physical layer
security still lacks a comprehensive and satisfactory finite
length analysis of different metrics especially for AWGN and
fading wiretap channels.
X. LESSONS LEARNED AND THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
We now provide a summary of the lessons learned, discuss
a number of challenges ahead and present some directions for
future research in this area.
A. Lessons Learned
The usual approaches for designing secure transmit signals
with Gaussian inputs lead to considerable losses when applied
to the signals drawn from finite constellations. This fact
motivates the need for development of secure transmission
schemes under the finite-alphabet input assumption.
In single-antenna transmission with constellation con-
strained inputs, achieving secrecy requires adoption of a proper
power allocation strategy. This is because transmission with
full power may allow the eavesdropper to successfully de-
tect the transmitted symbols. Moreover, the increased dimen-
sionality in multi-antenna transmissions can be employed to
enhance secrecy with finite-alphabet inputs. Precoding serves
as a promising strategy for maximizing the quality difference
between the signals received at the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper. Artificial noise injection offers considerable
secrecy gains and it well-suits the nature of secure trans-
mission with finite-alphabet inputs since the optimal power,
which is allocated to the information bearing signal is only
a fraction of the total power, and the excess power can be
used for artificial noise injection. In many cases (especially,
in the absence of instantaneous ECSI), without artificial noise
injection, secrecy rates drop to zero when the transmit power
increases. Therefore, injecting artificial noise is crucial for
guaranteeing a good saturation behavior at high SNRs.
The optimal secure transmission schemes are not known in
closed-form in (almost) any of the scenarios studied in this
survey. This is due to the non-convexity of the objective func-
tion (i.e., secrecy rate). Furthermore, the transmit signal design
algorithms, which rely on direct maximization of secrecy
rates, are computationally complex mainly due to the fact that
the mutual information expression under finite-alphabet inputs
lacks closed-form. Therefore, different studies focus their
attention on proposing lower-complexity alternatives to direct
secrecy rate maximization. There is also an important trade-off
between the secrecy rates and the computational complexity of
the existing solutions in the literature of physical layer security
with finite-alphabet inputs. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the
transmit signal designs based on metrics such as SINR or BER,
though simple and may be practical in some scenarios, do not
ensure secrecy in an information theoretic sense.
The amount of CSI at the transmitter plays a central role
in determining the secrecy performance of a particular trans-
mission scheme. Transmission algorithms employing full CSI
typically have a high capability in simultaneously increasing
the information rates at the legitimate receiver and suppressing
the reception at the eavesdropper, however, acquiring a perfect
instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropper may not be practically
possible in many scenarios. The achievable secrecy rates
undergo considerable losses in the absence of instantaneous
ECSI. However, nonzero secrecy rates are still attainable with
the aid of statistical ECSI or in some cases even without it
(i.e., with the aid of the MCSI only) [145].
Secure transmission design over multiuser channels, e.g.,
broadcast channel, is a more challenging task compared to
the point-to-point scenarios. This is because the proposed
solutions need to meet additional requirements, e.g., in terms
of inter-user interference. Similarly, various challenges arise
when moving to the scenarios with multiple eavesdroppers.
For instance, secure transmission along the null-space of the
eavesdropper’s channel is no longer possible in these scenarios
and designing an artificial noise signal to effectively degrade
the reception at the eavesdroppers is more complex than the
single-eavesdropper case.
Practical coding schemes exploit different tools from coding
theory and cryptography in order to ensure a certain level
of security and reliability (in terms of BERs) for Eve and
Bob, respectively. By combining coset coding and scrambling
approaches along with code concatenation, security gaps as
small as 1 dB can be obtained using finite-length explicit
and implementable codes. However, finding specific (and im-
plementable) finite-length codes, which can provide physical
layer security from an information-theoretic point of view,
remains as a future challenge.
B. Challenges and Open Problems
Various studies have been carried out on physical layer
security with discrete signaling with the objective of bridging
the gap between the information theoretic limits of secrecy
and practical and implementable secure transmission schemes.
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However, there still are many important open problems and
future challenges to be addressed in this area.
Physical layer security with finite-alphabet inputs has been
studied only for a limited set of CSI scenarios including
the cases with perfect and statistical MCSI and ECSI at
the transmitter. Some other important scenarios regarding the
CSI uncertainty at different nodes, e.g., noisy estimation of
CSI, outdated CSI or limited CSI feedback, which are well-
investigated under the Gaussian input assumption [8], have
not yet been considered for cases with finite-alphabet inputs.
It would be interesting and of significant practical value to
quantify the losses in the secrecy rates under these different
imperfect CSI scenarios in the context of finite-alphabet inputs.
While the majority of artificial noise injection strategies rely
on transmitting Gaussian distributed noise either by aligning
it in the null-space of the main channel or by optimizing
its covariance matrix, such artificial noise signals are not
necessarily optimal. For instance, it has been shown in [146]
that the worst case noise for AWGN channels with binary
inputs has a discrete distribution. This motivates seeking inter-
ference distributions (rather than merely optimizing covariance
matrices of Gaussian distributed signals), which maximize
secrecy rates.
While some steps have been taken in studying physical
layer security over finite-input multiuser networks (as sur-
veyed in Section VII), many important scenarios have not
yet been tackled. For example, no results have been reported
for interference channels with secrecy constraints under the
finite-alphabet input assumption (refer to [147] for an ex-
ample with Gaussian inputs). Secrecy issues concerning the
networks with simultaneous wireless information and power
transfer (SWIPT) is also a topic of recent interest [148]. It is
demonstrated that SWIPT networks are prone to information
leakage at the energy receivers, and hence, the main focus
of the existing articles is the characterization of the trade-off
between the secrecy capacity/rate and the harvested power in
these networks [149]-[152]. Studying this trade-off under the
practical discrete signaling assumption is an important subject
for future research. Furthermore, physical layer security in
heterogeneous networks [153] and with full duplex transmitter
or receivers (see, e.g. [154] and [155]) are very important, and
extending the existing results for these scenarios to the case
of finite-alphabet inputs is an interesting direction for future
research.
Massive MIMO systems provide considerable gains in
secrecy capacity. However, for such systems, besides the
opportunities offered, many challenges arise in secure transmit
signal designs with finite-alphabet inputs. For instance, most
of the existing precoder design approaches (such as the ones
proposed in [39] and [47]) are intractable when the number
of antennas is high. Secure mmWave transmission is another
promising research frontier. Communicating at the mmWave
spectrum considerably changes the channel model with respect
to the microwave communication systems, and introduces
some new features (e.g., high sensitivity to blockages and
considerable differences between the line-of-sight and non-
line-of-sight receptions), which motivates development of
new frameworks for designing practical secure transmission
schemes.
Taking into account the hardware constraints in designing
secure massive MIMO systems is another topic worth investi-
gating. For example, secure transmission schemes can be pro-
posed with finite-alphabet inputs for multi-antenna transmitters
with a single radio frequency (RF) chain (or a few, but less
than the number of antennas). Performance of wireless systems
can be considerably affected by different RF impairments
such as inphase/quadrature-phase (I/Q) imbalance, phase noise
or distortions due to the nonlinear power amplifiers, which
degrade the reception at the receivers (including the eavesdrop-
per); hence, this behavior can be exploited to enhance secrecy.
Moreover, various practical constraints arise in IoT systems
(e.g., in terms of complexity and energy efficiency) that should
be considered in designing secure transmission schemes. We
also note that, designing testbeds and conducting tests by
implementing physical layer security schemes is an essential
step, which should be taken before these techniques can
be adopted by actual communication systems. One example
of such experiments is reported in [156] where the authors
evaluate the secrecy performance of coset coding of lattice
constellations with the aid of a software defined radio testbed.
Another interesting direction for future work is to further
develop cross-layer design based solutions for securing com-
munications as only a limited number of works have been
reported on this topic so far. For instance, the authors in [157]
demonstrate the advantages of cross-layer protocol interactions
on the achievable secrecy by joint exploitation of automatic-
repeat-request (as a MAC layer operation) and maximal ratio
combining (as a physical layer operation). The potentials of
other layers can also be explored to enhance security. For
instance, employing authentication and watermarking strate-
gies at the application layer along with the coding and signal
processing at the physical layer [158] can lead to considerable
secrecy gains.
The main problem associated with designing practical cod-
ing schemes for physical layer security is the following:
Although the security gap is proposed and used as an alter-
native practical metric, the most widely accepted one (i.e.,
equivocation) relies on information theoretic quantities, and
computing these quantities for finite-length codes over AWGN
channels is a highly challenging problem, and can be an
important research direction on physical layer security. As
a final suggestion for future research, we recommend the
problem of precoder design in the scenarios where practical
wiretap codes are employed, which would be an important
step towards designing implementable secure transmission
schemes.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
An obligatory step towards practical implementation of
physical layer security is understanding the impacts of em-
ploying standard constellations on the secrecy performance.
With this motivation, this survey paper provides a summary
of the current literature on physical layer security with dis-
crete signaling and practical codes. We outline why and how
transmit signal design problem is different for the case of
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finite-alphabet inputs compared to Gaussian signaling, and
review existing algorithms for maximizing secrecy rates in a
variety of scenarios. We also provide an overview on practical
code constructions for physical layer security, and point out
important challenges and open problems on this topic.
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